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Abstract
At the Conference of Parties (COP 6 II) the sinks became a central issue in the Kyoto
negotiations. This paper illustrates the uncertainties involved in the greenhouse
accounting with respect to sinks. Different assessments, using the same basic data,
result in dramatically different results with respect to the sink capacities. In order to
achieve the targeted efforts with the sinks in the Kyoto process a new institutional setup
is required. An important component of this institutional setup is the introduction of
independent third party certification of greenhouse gas accounts and country reports
submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat.
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1 Background and Objective
The Conference of Parties (COP 6 II) decided in Bonn in July 2001 that
anthropogenic greenhouse gas removals by sinks are eligible under the Kyoto
Protocol (UN, 2001). Under Article 3.3 eligible activities are human-induced
afforestation, reforestation and/or deforestation activities started after 1 January 1990
and finished before the end of the commitment period. Under Article 3.4 afforestation,
reforestation, deforestation, revegetation, forest management, cropland management,
and grazing land management are eligible during the first commitment period. There
is no overall limit on sinks but specific categories will be limited. Cropland, grazing,
and revegetation are restricted to claim increased sequestration over 1990 levels.
Forest management caps are set for each Annex I country (in total 56.85 million tC).
National inventory systems shall ensure that areas of land subject to land-use, land-
use change and forestry activities under Articles 3.3 and 3.4 are identifiable and
reported in the national inventories. Each party in Annex I shall account for all
changes in the carbon pools of above-ground biomass, below-ground biomass, litter,
dead wood, and soil organic carbon (UN, 2001). In practice, this means that COP 6 II
is requesting Full Carbon Accounting.
This paper will use forestry sinks to illustrate the need for a different institutional
setup for greenhouse gas accounting and its verification in the Kyoto process
compared to the existing proposals by the Kyoto Protocol.
Grubb et al. (1999) have outlined the current institutional setup according to the
Kyoto Protocol and highlight among other things the following:
“Parties in Annex I shall institute national systems for compiling
inventories of greenhouse gases no later than a year before the start of
the first commitment period.
Information submitted under Article 7 shall be reviewed. It builds on the
existing Convention system of in-depth review teams coordinated by the
secretariat. Experts are to be nominated by parties and perhaps by
intergovernmental organizations. Inventories and assigned amounts
must be reviewed annually.
The expert teams are obliged to report back to the Conference/Meeting
of the Parties assessing the implementation of the commitments of the
2Party (concerned) and identifying any problems in, and factors
influencing, the fulfillment of commitments.
The secretariat is specifically tasked with listing the questions raised by
the expert reports and submitting the lists to the Conference/Meeting of
the Parties for decisions as required.”
For forestry it is specifically stated:
“Forestry-related activities shall be reported in a transparent and
verifiable manner, reflecting concerns about the uncertainties associated
with this sector.”
In the above description of the institutional setup national reports and experts
nominated by experts are crucial cornerstones. The suggested system is illustrated in
a schematic form in Figure 1.
Victor (2001a, b) identifies a number of key concerns with the current Kyoto Protocol
even though he does not specifically mention the institutional framework issue. He
points out that with respect to “sinks― enormous potential for cooking the books ―
only a monitoring program larger and more intensive than anything ever attempted
under international law could settle the inevitable disputes”. Victor (2001a, b) points
out that a consensus is emerging that trading is the key to realize the Kyoto Protocol.
In order to create an emission trading system emission permits worth hundreds of
billions of dollars have to be established. But uncertain accounting “will undermine
confidence in the value of emission permits and give governments strong financial
incentive to cook the books” (Victor, 2001b). Victor (2001b) also correctly points out
that the inaccurately measured fluxes permits cannot be assigned reliably and “the
security of the underlying property rights erodes and with this the efficiency of the
trading systems declines”. He also concludes that on-site inspections would be needed
for the accounting (even for fossil fuels in countries with doubtful accounting) in
order to get a reliable trading system established under the Kyoto Protocol and for
compliance. Kopp (2001) states that with no strong legal or economic incentives for
compliance some parties to the Protocol will choose not to comply if the costs of
verification are too high.
3Figure 1: Institutional Framework for Verification and Compliance According to the Kyoto Protocol. Simplified Scheme.
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42 TBFRA–2000
The institutional framework for verification of greenhouse gas accounting and
verification outlined in Figure 1 within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol can
already be validated. The validation can be carried out through the so-called TBFRA–
2000 (Temperate and Boreal Forest Resource Assessment year 2000) carried out by
the United Nations (UN, 2000a). In this assessment, the basic data was collected from
officially designated national correspondents by means of a questionnaire. The
original country data was collected on the basis of national definitions and measuring
and sampling techniques, which were validated and adjusted to international standards
by experts at the UN Secretariat. Experts were brought into the Secretariat to assess
the carbon cycle and balance based on the data delivered by the national
correspondents (UN, 2000a). The carbon balance of woody biomass was assessed for
the fifty-five countries covered by TBFRA–2000 on “forest and other wooded land”.
FAO released a press release on 15 March 2001 stating, “The UN Food and
Agriculture Organization’s Forest Information System, based on its Forest Resources
Assessments, could become a tool for assessing the changes in forest carbon stocks,
under the Kyoto Protocol” (FAO, 2001).
2.1 Russia
Russia has some 20% of the world’s forests both from area and growing stock volume
points of view (UN, 2000a). With proper management the Russian forests could play
an important role within the Kyoto Protocol framework and many countries are
looking towards Russia for trading of carbon permits.
The TBFRA–2000 report (UN, 2000a) presents the carbon balance for woody
biomass on forest and other wooded land as an annual average for 1988–1993 (1990
base year for the Kyoto Protocol). The results are presented in Table 1 together with
results from Shvidenko and Nilsson (2001), which are also based on the same basic
official inventory information as in TBFRA–2000.
Table 1 reveals some major differences in spite of the fact that the basic forest
information in both cases should be based on the same data, namely the Russian
official forest inventory (State Forest Account). Areas of forests and other wooded
lands reported by TBFRA do not make any sense. According to the TBFRA definition
forests include closed forests, i.e., “land with tree cover (or equivalent stocking level)
of more than 10%” and areas “which are temporarily unstocked as a result of human
intervention or natural causes but which are expected to revert to forest” (UN,
2000a:386). This means that all forest land (Russian terminology) of 886.5 million ha
should be included. But TBFRA is reporting 816.5 million ha. With the employed
TBFRA definition there is no difference between “forests” and “forests and other
wooded land” with respect to Russia. There are major differences between the
TBFRA (UN, 2000a) conversion/expansion factors from wood volumes to biomass
and the Shvidenko and Nilsson (2001) estimates. The first is based on aggregated
simple conversion factors and the latter on detailed inventory information. For further
details on these differences see Shvidenko and Nilsson (2001). The TBFRA data on
increments (which are not fully assessed by the Russian inventory) leads to some
5unrealistic TBFRA conclusions: (1) gross annual increment (average per ha) on other
wooded land is twice as big as in closed forests: 3.21 m3/ha-1 and 1.63 m3/ha-1
respectively (UN, 2000a:189), and (2) the net annual increment provides
accumulation of carbon in growing stock on other wooded land and in trees outside
forests of +37 and +41 million tC yr-1 respectively. It is also clear that the Russian
correspondents underestimated mortality in the Russian forests by 2–2.5 times.
Table 1: Comparison of the annual average carbon balance 1998–1993 of woody
biomass on forest and other wooded land in Russia based on TBFRA–2000
(UN, 2000a) and Shvidenko and Nilsson (2001).
TBFRA–2000
(UN, 2000a)
Russian Inventory
(Shvidenko and Nilsson, 2001)
“Forests” 816.5 million ha
(probably includes
unforested areas, but
probably excludes sparse
forests of 62.1 million ha)
763.5 million ha
(closed forests)
“Forests and other
wooded land”
886.5 million ha 886.5 million ha
(forest land)
“Growing stock” on
“Forests”
85.49 billion m3a 80.68 billion m3
“Gross annual” increment
of wood
• Forests
• Other wooded
land/unforested area
1.62 m3/ha-1
3.21 m3/ha-1
2.46 m3/ha-1
0.20 m3/ha-1
“Biomass expansion factor
above-ground tree biomass
from wood volume”
• Forests
• Other wooded land
0.26 tC/m3
5.1 tC/m3b
0.30 tC/m3
0.33 tC/m3
“Total increment” of wood
Gross growth
Natural losses/Mortality
Net growth
1328 million m3 yr-1
359
969
1880 million m3 yr-1
914
966
Average carbon
sequestration in 1988–1993
429 million tC yr-1 -9 million tC yr-1
(official inventory)
+38 million tC yr-1
(restored official inventory)
a Including “large branches”, which are not defined by TBFRA.
b Assessed for 1993.
The final result is that TBFRA (UN, 2000a) estimates the average yearly carbon
sequestration in woody biomass at 428 million tC yr-1 in Russia and the Shvidenko
and Nilsson estimate is a source of -9 million tons (official inventory) and a sink of 38
million tC yr-1 (restored official inventory). Thus, a difference of some 400 million tC
6yr-1. An overestimate of the forestry sink capacity by about 400 million tC yr-1
corresponds to some 75% of the total net emissions of C (all sources) in 1990 in
Russia (527 million tC yr-1) based on full carbon accounting (Nilsson et al., 2000).
The above can be compared with the Second National Communication of the Russian
Federation under the Framework Convention on Climate Change of 10 June 1998,
which is also based on the official forest inventory data. For 1990, the Second
National Communication reports a sequestration of 243 million tC yr-1 in forest
biomass on closed forests and 19 million tC yr-1 in the remaining part of the forest
fund, which is larger than “other wooded land” used in TBFRA. This makes in total a
sequestration of 262 million tC yr-1 in 1990. An interesting observation is that the
Secretariat of the Framework Convention on Climate Change carried out an in-depth
review of the Second National Communication of the Russian Federation in 2000
(UN, 2000b). This in-depth review has no questions whatsoever on the reported
carbon balance for the Russian forests.
With respect to the TBFRA study (UN, 2000a), it can be concluded that the national
correspondents provided very free manipulations of the official reported forest
inventory data and estimated other indicators, not defined by the official Russian
inventory, in an unsatisfactory manner. This can be a result of misunderstandings by
the correspondents of questionnaires and definitions used by the TBFRA Secretariat.
It is also clear that the experts used by the TBFRA Secretariat for the carbon
assessment were not able to detect the mistakes and, in addition, they also
misinterpreted other Russian data in the succeeding steps of the carbon assessment.
It is also obvious that the Second National Communication did not use the reported
official forest inventory data. If this had been done the Communication would have
presented a different result. In a similar way, it is also clear that the expert team
carrying out the in-depth review (UN, 2000b) was not able to detect the mistake.
2.2 Canada and Australia
The TBFRA study (UN, 2000a) states that the carbon balance for Canada with respect
to total woody biomass in 1994 on forest and other wooded land (417.6 million ha)
constitutes a net sink (after harvest) of 92.7 million tC yr-1. Kurz and Apps (1999)
have studied the Canadian forest carbon balance for many years and have published a
75-year retrospective detailed analysis of the carbon fluxes. For a forest area of 404.2
million ha they assess the annual average flux, for the period 1990–1994, of the total
forest biomass to be a net source of 36.8 million tC yr-1. During the studied 75-year
period, the Canadian forest biomass turned from being a substantial sink to a source
with a peak in the source capacity in the second half of the 1980s. Kurz and Apps
(1999) claim that disturbances of fires, insects and harvesting played a major part of
the abrupt change in the forest’s role from a sink to a source. It seems plausible that
the TBFRA study has seriously underestimated the impact of the disturbances in the
assessment (in a similar way as for Russia). The difference in the assessment between
the two studies is some 130 million tC yr-1 in the fluxes, which is rather remarkable
due to the fact that both studies are using the Canadian National Forest Inventory as a
basis.
7For Australia, the TBFRA study (UN, 2000a) reports in 1994 a net sink of 42.6
million tC yr-1 for total biomass (after harvest) on forest and other wooded land. But
the National Greenhouse Gas Inventory of Australia1 reports for 1990 a net sink of 6.7
million tC yr-1. The corresponding assessments for 1994 and 1999 for both years are
6.3 million tC yr-1 (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2001). This corresponds to an
overestimate by 6–7 times in the case of the TBFRA study. It should also be pointed
out that the assessments of the forest fluxes by the Australian Greenhouse Office
(2001) do not include conversion of forests and grasslands, which is treated as a
separate subsector and has substantial net emissions. The emissions from this
conversion in 1994 and 1999 were 17.9 million tC yr-1 and 19.6 million tC yr-1
respectively. The Australian Greenhouse Office (2001) concludes, “high uncertainties
remain for this sector [LUC&F] and must be considered in analyses such as the
compilation of trends for greenhouse gases in Australia”.
2.3 Europe
There are different assessments of the forestry carbon budget for Europe. However,
they are very difficult to compare. One approach is the UNFCCC and EU Monitoring
Mechanisms but, in spite of these mechanisms, for the time being no unique
methodology exists within the EU15 to estimate C sinks and sources from land-use
and forestry (Löwe et al., 2000; JRC, 2000). The TBFRA–2000 (UN, 2000a) study
discussed above for Russia also covers Europe. Schelhaas and Nabuurs (2001) have
recently published a study on stocks and fluxes of forests in Europe. In addition, there
are a number of studies with respect to an atmospheric CO2 sampling network (e.g.,
Valentini et al., 2000; JRC, 2000). Löwe et al. (2000) and JRC (2000) have tried to
make a comparison of some of these studies and JRC (2000) concludes that the
reporting of carbon sinks and sources in forestry in Europe is not sufficient to fulfill
future requirements with regard to the Kyoto Protocol. We have used basic data
presented by Löwe et al. (2000); JRC (2000), UN (2000a) and Schelhaas and Nabuurs
(2001) but have made a number of recalculations in order to be able to make a
comparison for a number of European countries (Table 2). A possible comparison
covers nine countries and is valid for so-called exploitable forests (non-exploitable
forests and other wooded land are not included) and the woody biomass (above- and
below-ground) carbon fluxes before harvests (Net Ecosystem Production of the wood
part of forest biomass, NEP), and the data cover, on average, the Kyoto baseline of
1990.
The difference in the totals is substantial (about 30%) for the different assessments.
The largest total sinks are reported through the UNFCCC and EU Monitoring
Mechanisms, which could be expected. The TBFRA–2000 has a 19% lower total
estimate and the Schelhaas and Nabuurs study has 23% lower total estimate than
reported in the mechanisms. This may indicate an overestimation of the uptake by the
mechanisms. If this is a systematic overestimate of the uptake and it would be applied
for all EU15 countries, the emissions of 1990 (EU, 1996) and the agreed emission
reductions made in Bonn in July 2001 means that just the overestimate in the national
reports on forestry uptake corresponds to some 20% of the agreed total emission
reductions.
1 Available on the Internet: http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/inventory/inventory/landuseforestry.html.
8Table 2: Woody biomass (above- and below-ground) carbon fluxes (uptake) before
harvests on exploitable forests in some countries of Europe around 1990,
million tC yr-1.
Assessment
Country
UNFCCC and EU
Monitoring Mechanisms
based on JRC (2000) and
Löwe et al. (2000)
TBFRA–2000
(UN, 2000a)
Schelhaas
and
Nabuurs
(2001)
Belgium 1.94 1.35 1.23
Denmark 1.36 1.09 1.18
Finland 27.31 24.12 22.76
France 36.90 27.30 21.11
Ireland 1.87 1.02 1.36
Italy 9.85 6.03 9.94
Portugal 4.16 5.22 2.79
Spain 10.98 9.04 10.63
UK 4.23 4.42 4.76
Total 98.60 79.59 75.76
In some cases, the differences for individual countries are much more dramatic. For
France, the two studies outside the mechanisms have 25–40% lower uptake than the
sinks reported according to the mechanisms. The TBFRA–2000 study has nearly 40%
lower estimate for Italy compared to the mechanism estimate. These illustrated
differences would not be acceptable within the Kyoto framework and could not be
used in any reliable trading system of permits. It should also be pointed out that the
assessments through the atmospheric CO2 sampling network also shows substantially
different results (however, they cannot be directly compared with the studies in Table
2) with the studies discussed here.
2.4 Austria
There are a number of different assessments for Austria and it would be of interest to
compare these. In addition to the Löwe et al. (2000), JRC (2000), UN (2000a), and
Schelhaas and Nabuurs (2001) studies discussed earlier we are also using a study by
Weiss et al. (2000), the Austrian inventory reports for Annex I Parties to be submitted
to the UNFCCC (FEA, 2000), and a detailed case study by IIASA (Jonas and Nilsson,
2001).
The different studies use somewhat different time periods in the assessments. Löwe
et al. (2000) and JRC (2000) do not specifically specify the time period used in the
1990s but reflect the first half of the 1990s. The TBFRA–2000 (UN, 2000a)
compares data from two time periods and for Austria use 1986–1990 and 1992–1996
respectively. Schelhaas and Nabuurs (2001) use data dated 1986–1990 for Austria
(Nabuurs, 2001). Weiss et al. (2000) present data for the period 1961–1996. In 2000,
the Federal Environment Agency (FEA, 2000) submitted updated Inventory
Information according to the Common Reporting format to the UNFCCC for the
period 1990–1996. Jonas and Nilsson (2001) use data for the period 1988–1994. It
9should be stressed that there are substantial differences in the uptake between
individual years. The comparison of the different assessments is based on woody
biomass (above- and below-ground biomass) carbon fluxes (uptake) before harvests
on exploitable forests (Table 3).
Table 3: Woody biomass (above- and below-ground biomass) carbon fluxes (uptake)
before harvest on exploitable forests in Austria, million tC yr-1.
Above- and Below-ground Biomass
Löwe et al.
(2000) and
JRC (2000)
FEA
(2000)
Weiss
et al.
(2000)
TBFRA–2000
(UN, 2000a)
Schelhaas and
Nabuurs (2001)
Jonas and
Nilsson
(2001)
1986–1990
(average) 9.5 15.9
1988–1992
(average) 9.3
1988–1994
(linear) 10.5
1992–1996
(average) 8.1 8.1 8.3 14.9
The variation in the assessments presented in Table 3 is huge. The range is between
8.1–15.9 million tC yr-1. We regard the Jonas and Nilsson (2001) study to be the most
detailed assessment carried out using different sources outside the basic forest
inventory information to verify the latter. The uncertainty range in the Jonas and
Nilsson (2001) assessment for 1990 is -1.5 to +2.1 million tC yr-1. The important
point to stress is that all assessments use the same basic data, namely the Austrian
forest inventory, but end up with a huge variation in the assessments. Thus, in this
case the UNFCCC mechanism reports substantial lower sink capacity than the
independent studies.
It seems obvious from these comparisons that any assessment of the
carbon/greenhouse gas balance (1) has to be evaluated by third party experts having a
solid knowledge in carbon and greenhouse gas accounting and knowing the very
specifics of the country reviewed, and (2) specific requirements on forest greenhouse
gas accounting have to be explicitly formulated and agreed upon by the Parties.
Otherwise there will be all kinds of possibilities for the individual countries to, using
Victor’s (2001b) terminology, “cook the books”.
3 Independent Third Party Reviews of Accounts
Every international agreement requires a solid solution on verification and compliance
mechanisms and efficient monitoring to discover deviates from the treaty
requirements (Cooper, 2000). Anderson (2001) identifies that one “crunch” in this
process is how to get efficient monitoring, “governments are likely to want assurance
that their competitors cannot simply ignore commitments”. He also concludes that
sinks can only be understood by specialists. Chayes and Chayes-Hendler (1995)
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conclude that most of the apparent deviations from treaty provisions arise from
different kinds of ambiguities. Noble and Scholes (2001) make it clear that
verifiability, rather than measurability per se, may be the key issue with respect to
biospheric pools (and other pools) in an international agreement.
There are strong ties between the accounting of greenhouse gases, their uncertainties,
reporting to the international mechanisms, verification and compliance. Nilsson et al.
(2000) have demonstrated that there are substantial uncertainties involved in the
current greenhouse gas accounting methods, especially for sinks. Nilsson et al.
(2001a, b) conclude that a solid verification mechanism is required in order to move
the climate process forward. This conclusion is further stressed by the outcome of the
Bonn meeting of COP 6 II in July 2001, where forest and land use management were
introduced as eligible measures and opened up sink allocations for large “sink”
countries like Canada, Russia, and Australia. In order to reach this solid verification
mechanism, a full gas accounting with uncertainty assessments is a must (Nilsson et
al., 2000; 2001a, b). With respect to forestry this view is also strongly supported by
the global forest industry (FIA, 2000).
Thus, it is solidly documented that there are substantial uncertainties with the
greenhouse gas accounting. This is not only valid for the sinks but also for the energy
sectors. There are studies showing that the uncertainties are substantially higher for
the energy sector in many countries compared with the general recycled uncertainty
figure of ±10% (IPCC, 2000). Other studies show that the uncertainties can be much
higher in the energy sector especially in the transition countries (17% Nilsson et al.,
2000; ±35–60% Parkinson et al., 2001).
On top of these accounting uncertainties are the uncertainties connected with
reporting to the international mechanisms. In order to come up with a solid
verification these uncertainties should be under control. There seems to be widespread
acceptance that countries submit their national inventory data for external review. But
the “crunch” is how this external review is carried out (Nilsson et al., 2001a).
There is also a lack of consensus in the understanding of the term “uncertainty”. It is
very symptomatic that the IPCC Report “Land-use, Land-use Change and Forestry”
(IPCC, 2000) defined “accuracy” and “precision” in a purely statistical way, but did
not consider any intrinsic features of the carbon account uncertainties. Any carbon
budget (and particularly for forests) is a non-stationary stochastic process with
significant irregular variability and evident features of fuzzy systems. This means that
classical statistical methods of estimating uncertainties are only applicable at separate
and rather limited states of carbon evaluations, at least at the national (regional) level.
There are different approaches and suggestions on how to deal with this problem (e.g.,
Chen et al., 2000, Nilsson et al., 2000). Nilsson et al. (2000) define uncertainty as “an
aggregation of insufficiencies of the full carbon accounting system outputs, regardless
of whether these insufficiencies result from a lack of knowledge, the intricacies of the
system, or other causes” and suggest a formal way of estimating accuracy, precision
and uncertainties, based on partial involvement of expert estimates and personal (a
priori) probabilities. Currently, it is not clear what philosophy and methodology
would be acceptable for the Parties, but an anticipatory discussion on the problem
seems necessary and urgent.
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3.1 Independent Third Party Certification
One way of getting reliable validation is to have independent third party certification
of the national inventory mechanisms and the national reporting mechanism. Third
party certification is already under implementation in forestry with respect to
sustainable forest management (CEPI, 2001). We think many lessons can be made
from the implementation of certification for sustainable forest management with
respect to greenhouse gas verification. We use studies by Bass and Simula (1999),
Kanowski et al. (2000), Rametsteiner (2000), and Fern (2001) to sketch an outline of
a certification system for greenhouse gas accounting and verification.
The original purposes with a certification scheme for greenhouse gas accounting
would be: (1) to improve the quality of the accounting and the reporting and decrease
the associated uncertainties with those mechanisms, and (2) to provide market
advantage in a trading process of greenhouse gas permits. (We concluded earlier that
trading is the key option for moving the climate negotiations into implementation.)
Certification can be defined as an established and recognized verification procedure
that results in a certificate on the quality of the greenhouse gas accounting and the
reporting in relation to a set of predetermined criteria based on an independent third
party assessment with rights to do site inspections. The verification takes place
through the audit, which is carried out by an independent third party composed of
experts on greenhouse gas accounting.
There are a number of bodies involved in the certification. The first is the standard-
setting body, which establishes the set of predetermined criteria (or certification
standards) for the audit. Based on recommendations by the Intergovernmental Panel
for Climate Change (IPCC) and clearance by COP, the UNFCCC Secretariat can act
as the standard-setting body. The Accreditation body recognizes, against published
criteria of capability, competence and impartiality, the independent third party
certification bodies involved in the auditing. The COPs can act as the accreditation
body. The certification body is carrying out the auditing and verification of the
greenhouse gas accounting and reporting, resulting in the certificate.
3.2 Multiyear Certification Periods
We have illustrated in this paper that there are substantial inter-annual variations in
the sink uptake (see also Shvidenko and Nilsson, 2001). However, the inter-annual
variations are not only linked to the sinks but also to the swings in the business cycles
in the energy and industrial emissions of greenhouse gases. Therefore, the appropriate
certification period should be long enough to take care of these variations through
averaging. Sandalow and Bowles (2001) have expressed similar views.
3.3 Permanent Court of Arbitration
The existing climate treaty is full of ambiguities, which are bound to cause conflicts
between countries and other stakeholders in the climate negotiations. The
uncertainties in the existing greenhouse gases and the national reporting illustrated in
this paper calls for a body to come up with dispute resolutions. The Permanent Court
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of Arbitration (PCA, 2001) has recently proposed a set of optional arbitration rules to
be added to the existing rules of the Permanent Court of Arbitration for settlement of
disputes connected with the climate convention and the Kyoto Protocol (among other
environmental issues) due to the absence of a forum for resolution seeking of conflicts
by different stakeholders. The proposal is that the optional rules could be set up as a
tribunal under the UNFCCC Secretariat or an ad hoc basis.
4 New Institutional Setup
After being through the analysis we can conclude that from a sink point of view there
is need for institutional changes within the Kyoto process. However, we have used
forestry as a basis for the illustration of problems but the problem identification is also
valid for other sectors of the greenhouse gas balance. Based on the findings in this
paper we can modify the existing institutional structure presented in Figure 1. This
modified structure is presented in Figure 2.
The proposed scheme means that the countries have national accounting systems
based on full accounting with uncertainty assessments with linked reporting for the
international mechanism. The accounting schemes as well as the reports are going
through a certification mechanism including standard-setting, accreditation, and
certification bodies as discussed in Section 3.1. The certification body submits the
certificate on the accounting scheme and reports to the UNFCCC Secretariat and the
C/MOPs. The certification should cover a multiyear period in order to average the
inter-annual variations of the greenhouse gas balances. The certification body has the
right to make site inspections.
The C/MOPs deal with the certified products in the current mode. Possible conflicts
on the accounts and reports are sent to the Permanent Court for Arbitration for
settlement.
The proposed structure does not change the current basic structure proposed by the
Kyoto process but it will increase the bureaucracy and the costs for the international
climate protection mechanism. But we think this is necessary in order to avoid the
current mud of greenhouse gas accounting and related national reporting.
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Figure 2: Modified Institutional Framework for Verification and Compliance of Greenhouse Gas Accounting.
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